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Abstract Is the law of ownership a barrier to energy
upgrades in apartment blocks? Co-owners in multi-
owned properties face challenges in reaching agreement
to implement energy efficiency measures that owners of
single family residences do not encounter. At the European
level, this difficulty is recognised in Article 19 of the 2012
Energy Efficiency Directive, by which governments are
obliged to address barriers to improvements which arise in
the specific context of multi-owner properties. Despite this,
the position of apartment owners remains mostly invisible
in the policy discourse. The small quantity of literature
examining the difficulties of group decision making
around energy efficiency in apartments has so far focused
on mapping the issues. This paper begins the process of
‘colouring in’ the existing outlines by providing an in-
depth delineation of the governance barriers to energy
upgrades presented by the law of ownership and
management in two European jurisdictions: England and
Scotland. A doctrinal analysis is employed to ascertain the
relevant legal issues and identify how property law consti-
tutes a barrier to energy upgrades within the framework of
existing behavioural models. A theoretical inquiry is
then used to suggest that reconceptualising property
law in the context of multi-owner properties to focus
on collective responsibilities rather than individual
rights may help to minimise this effect of the law.
The paper concludes with recommendations for fur-
ther research to identify the range of issues property
law presents across EU member states. This data is
needed to fully test the reconceptualisation hypothe-
sis presented here.
Keywords End-use energy efficiency. Decision
making . Buildings . Law. Scotland . England
Introduction
To achieve its target of 20% energy savings by 2020, the
European Union has major ambitions for the refurbish-
ment of existing housing stock, set out most notably in
the 2010 recast Energy Performance of Buildings Di-
rective1 and the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive
(EED).2 Forty percent of European dwellings are
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1 Directive 2010/31/EU of The European Parliament and of The
Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings
(recast).
2 Directive 2012/27/EU of The European Parliament and of The
Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency.
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multi-owned properties (MoPs) (Bright and Weatherall
2017)—known variously as apartments, condominiums
and multifamily buildings amongst other terms—and
the majority of the European housing stock is privately
owned (Eurostat 2015). Accordingly, retrofitting of
MoPs must form a key aspect of energy efficiency
strategy for governments throughout the EU. Studies
show, however, that MoPs, whether purpose built or
converted from other buildings, are in many countries
less likely to undergo major refurbishment than single
family houses (Low Energy Apartment Futures (LEAF)
2016). The barriers to energy upgrades that apply in all
types of home (such as the need for upfront financing)
are compounded for MoPs by the complexity of the way
that MoPs are owned and management decisions are
taken. Further, within the EU, each country has different
national laws about howMoPs are owned and managed.
The dimension of ‘owning part within a whole’ raises
important practical and theoretical issues about the na-
ture of ownership and responsibility to others.
The EED recognises that multi-owned and multi-
occupied buildings face particular challenges in relation
to energy efficiency upgrades. Article 19 requires gov-
ernments to address barriers to improvements in MoPs
which relate to the fact that there may not be rules for
cost sharing, individuals may not obtain full benefits
from the improvement, or decision-making processes
may need better regulation. Despite this recognition,
Matschoss et al. (2013, p. 1493) suggest that the partic-
ular problems ofMoPs are not ‘very visible in the policy
discourse’ targeting buildings and the environment,
which tends to focus ‘on barriers to energy investment
at a relatively generic level’.
This paper focuses on the specific barriers to energy
upgrades in apartments created by the law regulating
ownership and management of MoPs. By energy up-
grades,3 we refer to installations of energy efficiency
improvements to building fabric (insulation or improved
windows); installation or upgrades to deliver more effi-
cient, lower carbon and renewable energy heating sys-
tems; energy efficiency upgrades to other fixed energy-
using systems in the building (lighting, ventilation and
elevators); installation of renewable electricity genera-
tion (principally solar photovoltaics (PV)); and installa-
tion of smart metering or other building energy
management system. Depending on the measure and
the building concerned, these measures may be installed
within (or to the sole benefit of) individual apartments or
across the whole building.
The first part of the paper contains a review of
literature on barriers to energy efficiency in this context,
summarising the relevant barriers that have been
recognised by earlier studies. ‘Methodology’ then sets
out the methodological approaches employed in the
remainder of the paper, namely a doctrinal analysis
followed by a theoretical inquiry. In ‘Governance ar-
rangements in England’ and ‘Governance arrangements
in Scotland’, doctrinal analysis is employed to ascertain
the law concerning ownership and management of
MoPs in two European jurisdictions with very distinct
legal systems: England and Scotland. ‘How property
law acts as a barrier to energy upgrades in MoPS’ relies
on these doctrinal findings to identify how property law
constitutes a barrier to energy upgrades within the
framework of existing behavioural models. In
‘Reconceptualising property law in MoPS to minimise
governance barriers’, a theoretical inquiry drawing on
‘progressive property’ scholarship is used to develop the
argument that property law should be reconceptualised
in the context of MoPs to focus on the collective respon-
sibilities shared by every person with a legal interest in
the building rather than on the rights held by individual
apartment owners. The hypothesis is presented that this
ground-level reconceptualisation would serve to mini-
mise the role of property law as a barrier to energy
upgrades in MoPs. The paper concludes with recom-
mendations for further research to identify the range of
issues property law presents across EU member states.
This data is needed to fully test the reconceptualisation
hypothesis suggested in ‘Reconceptualising property
law in MoPS to minimise governance barriers’.
Existing literature on barriers to energy efficiency
This paper situates itself within the broader literature on
the ‘energy efficiency gap’ (Hirst and Brown 1990) that
exists between actual energy use and optimal levels of
energy efficiency variously defined (Jaffe and Stavins
1994). Since this gap was first identified, researchers
across a range of disciplines have used barrier models to
explain its existence. Weber (1997, p. 834) identifies a
barrier model in this context as encapsulating three
features—the objective obstacle, the subject hindered
3 We intentionally use, as a general term, ‘energy upgrades’ rather than
‘energy improvements’ as the contested interpretation of the term
‘improvement’ in property law is one of the main themes of the paper.
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and the action hindered—and describes the methodo-
logical question of how to determine a barrier model as
‘what is an obstacle to whom reaching what in energy
conservation?’.
A dominant policy and research model for under-
standing energy use is ‘PTEM’—a physical, technical
and economic model which adopts an engineering-
centric approach to energy efficiency which in turn is
affected by economics (Lutzenhiser 1993; Janda et al.
2015). Within this model, human behaviour is implicitly
assumed to be economically rational. In the context of
MoPs, however, human behaviour is importantly medi-
ated by property law and ownership arrangements,
which will affect how decisions are taken and the way
in which economic factors play out. Hirst and Brown’s
(1990) original work recognised the importance of bar-
riers to rational decision making for energy efficiency—
both structural barriers (including limited access to cap-
ital, government fiscal and regulatory policies, codes
and standards) and behavioural barriers (including atti-
tudes towards energy efficiency, perceived risk of
energy-efficiency investments, information gaps and
misplaced incentives). Sorrell et al. (2000, p. 12) classi-
fy barriers that limit the installation of technologies that
are energy efficient and economically efficient, stating
that these can be understood from ‘economic’, ‘behav-
ioural’ or ‘organisational’ perspectives. The legal and
governance arrangements explored in this paper consti-
tute particular barriers to energy efficiency that have
been neglected by the energy literature but can be un-
derstood within all of these perspectives. Thus, property
law and ownership arrangements prevalent in MoPs
cause and exacerbate problems of poorly defined prop-
erty rights and asymmetric information, leading to mar-
ket failure within the perspectives of ‘structural’ and
‘economic’ barriers identified by Hirst and Brown
(1990) and Sorrell (2000). Adopting Sorrell’s (2000)
organisational perspective, the co-owners of a MoP
can be understood as an organisation within which
power relations may inhibit action on energy upgrades.
Finally, behavioural barriers (identified by Sorrell 2000
and Hirst and Brown 1990) may include routines, prac-
tices and attitudes adopted by individuals or groups in
managing MoPs which inhibit energy efficiency
investments.
Other theoretical positions question the value of
analysing and categorising barriers to energy efficiency.
These authors argue such an approach has failed to close
the ‘energy efficiency gap’ over the past 40 years or so
(Janda et al. 2015, p. 3; Shove 2010, p. 1274). Although
we are cognisant of these criticisms, we use the language
of barriers in particular because this has been adopted as a
language by energy efficiency policy makers (for exam-
ple in the EED). The focus of our research is on ‘drilling
down’ into the detail of the property law in relation to
energy upgrades in MoPs, rather than on developing an
overall—or paradigm—framework.
A literature focusing on the particular barriers that
arise in relation to refurbishment of MoPs has begun to
emerge only recently. Important work carried out by
Matschoss et al. (2013) identified the collective
decision-making processes required of owners and other
interested parties in MoPs as a key obstacle that did not
easily find an equivalent in other contexts. This finding
is backed up by a 2014 survey of energy efficiency
policy makers from 21 countries for the Concerted
Action on the EED, in which 12 countries stated that
decision making between owners in residential build-
ings was ‘often’ or ‘always’ a barrier to energy efficien-
cy improvements (Forni and Zajáros 2014). Matschoss
et al. (2013, p. 1486) note that, in the case of owner-
occupied MoPs, lay people are ultimately responsible
for a very large and complex technical system with a
very long lifespan, and that the generally low rates of
renovation in Europe, and the generally low level of
energy improvement accomplished in renovations that
are made, suggest that owners are not up to these
responsibilities. Based on a literature review and
expert interviews, Matschoss et al. (2013) give an over-
view of how decision making is structured in apartment
buildings in nine European countries (Austria, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Ro-
mania and Spain), with a more detailed discussion of
three countries (Austria, Romania and Finland). Relying
on earlier work by Uihlein and Eder (2009), they cate-
gorise the barriers identified as (1) genuine uncertainties
as regarding cost-effectiveness, (2) financial barriers, (3)
organisational problems, (4) lack of information and
skills, (5) transaction costs and (6) other barriers that
may be context dependent, noting that the categories
tend to overlap and reinforce each other (Matschoss
et al. 2013, p. 1486). The LEAF (2016) project, an
Intelligent Energy Europe project which aimed to refur-
bish 24 apartment blocks in six countries, explored the
governance, ownership and management arrangements
for energy efficiency retrofit in Austria, Germany, Hun-
gary, France, the UK and Sweden. The reasons identi-
fied for apartment blocks having lower energy
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efficiency ratings compared with other kinds of build-
ings fell into four categories: technical issues (for exam-
ple, hard to treat solid wall construction), agreement
issues, financial issues and the behaviour of residents.
In research into the legal regulation of MoPs in
England, Bright and Weatherall (2017) suggest that
there is a meta-category of governance barriers—those
relating to the way in which MoPs are owned and
managed—which both represent and shape the content
of the various barriers referred to in the Matschoss and
LEAF studies. Further, Lujanen (2010) identifies that
the regulation of co-owned apartment blocks involves
the collision of two types of law—the laws of associa-
tion and property law—in ways that can cause conflict
and difficulty.4 These laws set up organisational struc-
tures that regulate whether (and how) owners constitute
themselves as a decision-making body and whether they
can readily collaborate to install and finance energy
upgrades in communal parts, and also in individual
apartments, without the risk of works being impeded
by the objections of a single or a small minority of
apartment owners. The rules of ownership also prescribe
how the building and apartments are owned—for exam-
ple, whether parts such as the roof, foundations and
windows are common parts or individually owned—
and who, if anyone, has the power to carry out energy
upgrades. Property law also determines financial issues
about cost sharing between co-owners and whether
owners can collaborate on funding upgrades. It is also
property law that can create (or avoid) informational
issues about who actually has the right to carry out such
work to which parts of the building. Sitting alongside
these governance arrangements will be regulatory mea-
sures about obtaining information about the energy ef-
ficiency of the building and potential for energy effi-
ciency upgrades. Law, therefore, creates a unique set of
barriers in relation to retrofit of MoPs, the detail of
which requires to be augmented.
Methodology
This paper begins the process of ‘colouring in’ the
outline provided by Matschoss et al. (2013), LEAF
(2016) and Bright and Weatherall (2017), by providing
an in-depth delineation of the governance barriers to
energy upgrades presented by the law of ownership
and management in two European jurisdictions: En-
gland and Scotland. In order to ascertain the relevant
law, a doctrinal analysis has been employed. Doctrinal
analysis can be described as a two-stage process in
which the researcher must first locate the relevant
sources of law (in this case, a combination of legislation,
precedent contained within case law and convention
arising from the common law of each jurisdiction), then
synthesise the material (in this case using a combination
of deductive logic following on the legislation and in-
ductive reasoning building up from case law and con-
vention) to produce a definitive statement of the legal
rules applicable in this area (Hutchinson and Duncan
2012, p. 111). The doctrinal approach is supplemented
by the co-authors’ expert knowledge of documentation
and models typically used in MoPs. A theoretical anal-
ysis is then undertaken, which involves a review of
literature relevant to a potential conceptual underpin-
ning of the law in question followed by advancing a
new normative framework that might justify reform of
the current legal rules (Hutchinson and Duncan 2012, p.
104). Contemporary property thought focuses upon the
rights of the individual, but in order to make energy
upgrades in blocks of flats it is necessary to recognise
that living in or owning a block of flats requires—at
some level—a commitment to collective living with
some of the sharing of costs and benefits. In many
respects this is a particular contextual manifestation of
a broader question that needs to be asked, to do with
how property rights generally might be affected by the
society-wide need to take action on climate change.
Despite both countries being part of the United King-
dom, England and Scotland have very different property
law regimes. The English model is unique within Eu-
rope and uses the sale of (very) long leases for apart-
ments, continuing the feudal ideas of landholding (me-
dieval in origin), whereas the Scottish model provides
for ownership of individual units and bears closer re-
semblance to many other systems found within Europe.
MoPs also play a different role in the two countries’
housing supply: in England only 21% of homes are
apartments, one of the lowest proportions in Europe
(DCLG 2015). In Scotland, 38% of homes are apart-
ments—much closer to the European average (Scottish
Government 2015). In both jurisdictions, there is a
distinct lack of data on the prevalence of the differing
4 He gives the example of Russia and Lithuania where courts have
upheld apartment owners’ rights not to join owners’ associations:
rulings which protect the important principle of freedom of association,
but which may not be helpful to good management and upkeep of the
buildings concerned.
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management and ownership arrangements possible for
apartment blocks. Our accounts of ‘typical’ arrange-
ments should therefore be understood as based on the
co-authors’ professional expertise, pending the gather-
ing of better empirical data. In England, the terms ‘flat’
and ‘block of flats’ are used to refer to individual units
within the MoP and the MoP building respectively. In
Scotland, the terms used are ‘flat’ and ‘tenement’.
Governance arrangements in England
Ownership
Twenty-one percent of homes in England are self-
contained flats (DCLG 2015). Around half of those are
flats which are in the ownership of private individuals,
rather than social housing providers (councils or regis-
tered not-for-profit housing providers) (Future Climate/
TLT/Oxford University 2015).
Unlike civilian law systems prevalent in the rest of
Europe, England has no concept of ‘absolute owner-
ship’ of land. Instead what can be owned is known as an
‘estate’, that is ‘land for a time’. These estates are
divided into ‘freeholds’ (land that is held for effectively
indefinite or perpetual time) and ‘leaseholds’ (land held
for a definite or certain time period). A block of flats will
have a freehold owner who owns the whole building,
including the ‘common’ (or ‘shared’) parts, and the
individual flats will be sold by the freeholder to lease-
holders.5 Typical leases are for 99, 125 or 999 years; if
the flat is later sold the leaseholder transfers the lease to
the new owner but the lease itself is not revised. Lease-
holders may be owner-occupiers or may rent the flat out.
The freehold of a block of flats is very often owned by a
private individual or company who is not resident in the
building, but simply collects a ‘ground rent’ from the
leaseholders. The ground rent is usually small, and the
value of the freehold of a whole building is nearly
always much less than the collective value of the leases.
However, the freehold of the block is not always pri-
vately owned: it may be owned by a social landlord
(local authority or non-profit housing organisation) or
jointly owned by the leaseholders.
Management arrangements
The document at the heart of the English system is the
lease which—as well as constituting the property right
in itself—is a detailed contract between the freeholder
and the leaseholder, determining the rights and respon-
sibilities of both parties. There is, however, no such
thing as a ‘standard lease’, and they are usually long,
complex, often badly drafted and not in plain English.
Notwithstanding the absence of standardisation, there
are general patterns of how responsibilities are divided
between the freeholder and leaseholder. Thus, the lease
will almost always state that the leaseholder has respon-
sibility for the maintenance of the interior of the flat and
will usually limit what changes the leaseholder can
make to the flat, and that the freeholder has the respon-
sibility for the repair and maintenance of the common
parts.
Within this broad pattern there are, however, impor-
tant details that will turn on the wording of the particular
leases. Although the freeholder is responsible for repair
and maintenance of the common parts, what constitutes
the ‘common parts’will depend on the specific wording.
Typically, the common parts include the roof, the foun-
dations, the structure (including exterior walls), entrance
halls, stairs, lifts, service conduits and shared outside
space. Responsibility for windows will depend on the
lease wording: it may be that the window frames belong
to the freeholder and the glass to the leaseholder or that
the leaseholder has both. Thus, the definition of what
constitutes the ‘flat’ as opposed to the common parts of
the building depends on the particular wording of the
lease.
The lease will provide for the freeholder to recover
the costs of the upkeep of the common parts of the block
from the leaseholders (the ‘service charge’) and will set
out the basis upon which the costs are apportioned
amongst leaseholders, but commonly it is based on a
percentage related to the size of the flat. Leaseholders
are able to challenge service charges before a Tribunal if
they are not ‘reasonably incurred’ (Landlord and Tenant
Act 1985, s. 19), a test that takes account not only of
whether it is reasonable to do the works but also whether
the cost itself is reasonable, and this may require con-
sideration to be given to the financial impact on the
leaseholders. Further, if the costs are above a certain
threshold, there is also a statutory consultation process
that must be carried out before the works can commence
(Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, s. 20).
5 In 2002, a new legal system for flat ownership was introduced in
England and Wales, called commonhold, which resembles condomin-
ium systems. But commonhold has not caught on, and anyway would
only apply to new flats as they are built, where the retrofit challenge is
at its least acute.
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Day-to-day management of the block and collection
of the service charge on behalf of freeholders may be
undertaken personally or through a managing agent. An
association of leaseholders can apply to be officially
recognised (known as a recognised tenants’ association
(RTA)) and is then entitled to information about the
management and has some consultation rights. The
RTA drafts its own constitution, which will cover issues
such as meetings and voting. Service charges are a
frequent source of dispute between freeholders and
leaseholders and there are various routes by which
leaseholders can take over more control of their building
from freeholders. Where the leaseholders in a block
collectively wish to do so they can nominate a purchaser
to buy the freehold (which is normally done through a
jointly owned company, but need not be) (Leasehold
Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993) or
they can exercise the ‘Right toManage’ (RTM)whereby
they take over the responsibility for the upkeep of the
building from the freeholder (but not the ownership)
(Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002). The
form of a RTM company is prescribed by statute and
provides that the directors are responsible for the
business of the company but there are no require-
ments to hold members’ meetings. Where the lease-
holders collectively own the building, the meeting
and voting requirements (if any) will be set out in
the relevant documents (usually the company’s Arti-
cles of Association).
Governance arrangements in England and energy
efficiency
The central, distinctive, feature of the English system is
the freeholder/leaseholder relationship. A typical lease
obliges the freeholder to ‘repair and maintain’ the build-
ing, but this does not cover improvements, so unless the
lease expressly (and unusually) refers to improvements
it is not possible for the freeholder (or management
company) to recover the cost of any energy efficiency
upgrades to the common parts. The distinction between
what is a ‘repair’ and what is an ‘improvement’ is
therefore a critical issue, but it is far from straightfor-
ward: as Lewison LJ recently observed, ‘there is no
bright line difference’ between the two.6 ‘Repair’ does
not include ‘improvement’ or even fixing ‘design faults’
unless this is necessary in order to conduct the repair (for
example, if the windows need replacing because they
are rotten, and building regulations require replacement
of single glazing with double glazed units).7 The instal-
lation of something new, such as wall insulation or solar
panels where previously there were none, will, however,
clearly amount to improvement.
The inability to recover the cost of improvements
will be the norm whether the freehold is owned by an
independent person or by the leaseholders collectively
and it is this non-existence of any mechanism for carry-
ing out improvements and recovery of improvement
costs through the lease that makes it extremely unlikely
that energy upgrades will be implemented. In practice,
this means that the only way in which energy upgrades
in communal areas can proceed is by the freeholder and
leaseholders agreeing unanimously—and separately
from the terms of their lease—that they want improve-
ment works to proceed, and how they will share the
costs.
Further, a typical private freeholder does not live in
the building and therefore has no financial reason to
make energy upgrades: the freehold value is unlikely
to increase much (if at all) and the ‘ground rent’ will not
change. Thus, despite having control of common areas,
freeholders generally have no financial incentive to
carry out works. The only exception will be a freeholder
who has some other motivation. This might be the case,
for example, where the building is owned by a social
housing provider who has a concern to improve the
condition of its rented housing, perhaps in order to help
to alleviate fuel poverty and improve comfort for its
tenants. Even then there will be difficulties with MoPs.
This is because many council-owned blocks will contain
a mix of both renters and leaseholders. This tenure mix
comes about because some of the flats that were initially
rented to tenants have been sold on long leases under the
right to buy (RTB)—a statutory right to purchase their
rented council home that was given to large numbers of
council tenants in 1980 (and recently reinvigorated), and
that has been exercised by nearly two million tenants
(DCLG 2016). As with other leases, many of these RTB
leases do not give the landlord power to make improve-
ments and recover the costs. Some social landlords,
however, have amended their standard RTB leases in
recent years to allow for improvements to be carried out
and the costs recovered through the service charge (al-
though it is unclear what motivated these changes).
6 London Borough of Hounslow v Waaler [2017] EWCA Civ 45. 7 See Quick v Taff Ely BC [1986] QB 809 (CA).
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Although there is no data on the proportion of RTB
leases that allow this, this means that it is sometimes
permissible, according to the lease wording, to carry out
improvements to the block of flats. The consequence of
the tenuremix is that when a council wants to refurbish a
block of flats it will have to ensure that the leaseholders
are ‘on-board’ with the plans as the leaseholders may
object either to the works themselves (perhaps, because
the work will be disruptive and arguably a ‘trespass’) or
to the costs (which the leaseholders can challenge under
the statutory process discussed above at ‘Management
arrangements’). The difficulties that can arise are illus-
trated in a case study of the deep retrofit of five tower
blocks in Oxford that is underway. The blocks are
owned by the local authority and occupied by a mix of
council rental tenants, leaseholders who have bought
under the RTB and private rental tenants who are renting
from leaseholders who have bought from the original
RTB purchasers. The local authority is carrying out a
major refurbishment of these blocks, which includes
significant energy efficiency upgrades, but the substan-
tial service charge bills (in the region of €55,000 per
unit) have led to opposition from some leaseholders, and
protracted litigation before a Tribunal (Bright et al.
2017).
Governance arrangements can also make energy ef-
ficiency upgrades difficult within individual flats.
Leases are not straightforward documents, and lease-
holders may be confused about their responsibility for
different building elements. In addition, leaseholders are
usually prohibited from making structural alterations
within their flat (and there is no clear guidance on what
is a structural alteration), although internal non-
structural alterations can generally be made. One prac-
tical illustration of the difficulties that might arise ap-
plies to condensing boilers. Since 2005, it has been a
requirement inmost domestic situations to install a high-
efficiency condensing boiler when replacing central
heating boilers (HM Government 2016 s. 4.26 and
HM Government 2013 p. 10), and this will require
venting through an external wall. However, the external
wall is almost always within the definition of ‘common
parts’ and therefore will belong to the freeholder so that
any work done to the external wall will involve a
‘trespass’.
In management arrangements where leaseholders
have more control—where they jointly own the free-
hold, or exercise the right to manage—energy efficiency
might be more likely to happen: certainly there are more
opportunities for formal decision-making structures to
be put in place which would allow for consideration of
the issues, and it may mean that more decisions can be
taken by majority. But there is no data to demonstrate
this, and none of these arrangements can change lease
wordings. This leaves the problem that it is usually not
possible to make energy upgrades in communal areas
and share costs without unanimous agreement including
all leaseholders and the freeholder or to make significant
alterations within individual flats.
Governance arrangements in Scotland
Ownership
Ownership of flats in Scotland is less complex than in
England. In Scotland, there is no leasehold form of
tenure. The owner of a flat will have the equivalent of
the English freehold, which is referred to simply as
‘ownership’.
The law governing flats is contained partly within the
common law and partly in the Tenements (Scotland) Act
2004. In combination, these set out default rules of
ownership of the various parts of a tenement. Each
individual flat, including its exterior walls, is owned
by the flat owner. A ground floor owner also owns the
foundations beneath his flat. If there are two or more
ground floor flats, each will own the section of the
foundations immediately below their individual flat. A
top floor flat owner also owns the roof above his flat.
Again, if there is more than one top floor flat, each will
own the section above it.
The tenement will also have ‘common parts’. These
include the main entry door from the street and the
stairwell or lift, and in almost all buildings will also
include shared pipes, gutters, chimney stacks and other
structural features. Also included within the common
parts are the section of the foundations below the stair-
well and the section of roof above it. The owner of each
flat in the block will also own a share of the common
parts. In other words, if there are six flats in the tene-
ment, each owner will have a one sixth share in the
common parts. This share in the common parts is held in
a form of tenure known as common ownership, which
allows every owner to make non-exclusive use of the
common parts.
It is important to note that these rules are only a
default. It is possible—and quite common—for the title
Energy Efficiency (2018) 11:1641–1655 1647
deeds to flats to vary these default rules. A fairly fre-
quent variation is for the roof to be owned in common
by all the individual flat owners rather than solely by the
owner of the top flat, for example. There is no standard
form which such variations will take and no empirical
evidence on the types or frequency of such variations.
Management arrangements
Decisions relating to repair, maintenance and improve-
ment of the different parts of a tenement are governed by
three different sets of default rules. Which rules apply
depends on the part of the tenement in question.
First, decisions in relation to the management of
strategic parts of the building are governed by the Ten-
ement Management Scheme, as set out in the 2004 Act.
The Act defines the strategic parts (referred to as
‘scheme property’) to include (a) the roof, the founda-
tions, external walls and any internal load bearing walls
and (b) any part of the building which is in common
ownership of the flat owners.
The Act provides that decisions in relation to the
maintenance of strategic parts of the building must be
taken by all owners of flats in the building, and must
also be paid for by all owners of flats in the building,
regardless of who actually owns the strategic part in
question. In other words, although A owns the top flat
and the roof, A is not free to keep (or neglect) the roof as
he sees fit. Instead, the right to decide onmaintenance of
the roof is shared amongst all flat owners in the building.
That cost is also shared by all owners in the building.
Such decisions are taken by way of a majority vote.
All flat owners must be consulted. Each owner is enti-
tled to one vote per flat owned. If a simple majority of
votes is in favour of maintenance to a strategic part of
the building, the work can go ahead. The cost of the
work is split amongst flat owners—usually one share of
the cost per flat owned, unless flats vary significantly in
size—regardless of whether the owner votes in favour of
the work or not.
Not every decision in respect of a strategic part of the
building can be taken using this process. The Act con-
tains a definition of ‘scheme decisions’—the types of
decisions which are to be regulated by the Scheme.
Essentially, scheme decisions cover maintenance and
repair of the strategic parts. Where what is sought is an
improvement, such as the installation of solar panels or a
new heating system, the Scheme has no application. For
clarity’s sake, these types of improvement decisions are
referred to in this paper as ‘non-scheme decisions’.
Second, decisions in relation to the management of
individual flats, or non-scheme decisions in relation to
any strategic part of the tenement which is in the own-
ership of a single owner, are taken by that owner alone.
Third, non-scheme decisions in relation to parts of
the tenement which are in common ownership must be
taken according to the common law rules. These require
unanimity amongst all the owners before work can go
ahead. Should one owner object, or simply remain si-
lent, work cannot proceed.
Once again, it is important to note that these rules
simply provide a default. It is common for the title deeds
of flats to contain express rules as to how management
decisions must be taken. These rules are usually created
in a form of title condition known as a ‘real burden’: a
positive or negative obligation on any owner of the flat,
which is usually enforceable by the owner (at the time
enforcement is sought) of any other flat in the tenement.
It is commonly the case that all owners in the block will
be subject to the same conditions, giving every owner
rights against every other owner, whilst also binding
him to the same conditions. Where such title conditions
exist, the Tenement Management Scheme will not ap-
ply, and the other default rules may be varied. As with
variations on the default ownership arrangements, there
is no standard form which variations in relation to
management arrangements will take and no empirical
evidence on the types or frequency of such variations.
Where decisions about repair, maintenance or im-
provement can or must be taken by a group of owners
(in other words, where they are scheme decisions, or
non-scheme decisions relating to commonly owned
parts of the building), there are no formal requirements
governing the decision-making process. In some cases,
an agent known as a factor will be engaged by the flat
owners within a tenement. The precise powers and
duties of the factor will be regulated by a contract
between it and the flat owners, but commonly the factor
will be obliged to carry out regular inspection of the
building and empowered to carry out work to the build-
ing where costs are below a certain amount and to co-
ordinate decision making where larger costs are entailed
by works. In tenements where no factor is employed,
owners must come to their own arrangements in man-
aging the decision-making process. Again, there is no
standard arrangement and no empirical evidence as to
the types of arrangements in place.
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Governance arrangements in Scotland and energy
efficiency
The law is complicated. A decision in relation to energy
upgrade works may fall within any one of the three sets
of default rules above or may not be dealt with by
default rules at all if the title deeds contain conditions
regulating the works. An owner is likely to have con-
siderable difficulty ascertaining which set of rules is
applicable in any particular case. As with English leases,
Scottish title deeds can be unclear and difficult docu-
ments, which may (probably inadvertently) restrict op-
portunities for energy upgrades and/or leave owners in
confusion about where responsibility lies for such
works.
The default Tenement Management Scheme, in ad-
dition to having no application where contradictory title
conditions are in place, is also restricted to decisions on
repairs and maintenance of strategic parts. Energy up-
grades are more likely to be considered ‘improvements’,
meaning the Scheme has no application. This difficulty
has been recognised to a certain extent by the Scottish
Parliament who—uniquely in the UK—legislated to
make energy upgrades easier for MoP owners, although
only in a very limited way. The Climate Change
(Scotland) Act 2009 amended the 2004 Act to specify
that installation of insulation falls within the definition
of maintenance. According to views expressed at an
event held by LEAF in early 2016, this change has
improved the rate of installation of insulation, at least
by social housing providers. Although this change is
welcome, its impact is obviously restricted, and there is
no suggestion at present that other types of upgrade be
brought within this definition.
The limited application of the TMS means that the
majority of decisions on energy upgrades will require
unanimous agreement of all owners in a tenement,
which is obviously difficult to achieve for any num-
ber of reasons, including lack of finance, differing
attitudes to the desirability of the work and difficulty
in contacting non-resident owners, perhaps particu-
larly those who have bought the flat as a rental
property.
The ownership structure within tenements means that
the problem above also exists where an energy upgrade
which benefits an individual flat requires use to be made
of a common part, usually for the installation of infra-
structure relating to that upgrade. Unanimity is needed
for that use to be made of the common part.
How property law acts as a barrier to energy
upgrades in MoPS
In this section, we draw on the evidence above to
identify a number of governance barriers to energy
upgrades in MoPs arising directly from the way in
which property law regulates ownership and manage-
ment of flats. These barriers straddle the categories of
financial barriers, agreement, organisational problems
and lack of information and skills identified by
Matschoss et al. (2013), LEAF (2016) and Bright and
Weatherall (2017) and discussed above. In the following
part, we develop the hypothesis that the underlying
difficulty with property law in this context is its focus
on the rights attaching to individual owners, rather than
the responsibilities of the collective. Without further
research, it is not possible to determine the precise
extent to which these problems are replicated in the
property law of other European jurisdictions, although
on the basis of the authors’ admittedly limited current
knowledge, it seems likely that every country will be
familiar with at least some of the barriers detected here.
Misalignment of incentives arising from ownership
rules
The law of ownership in England results in a misalign-
ment between the power (if any) to carry out energy
upgrades and the principal benefits resulting from such
works. The literature on energy policy refers to the
‘split-incentive’ problem as a commonly recognised
issue within landlord-tenant relationships, defined by
the UK Government as a situation where ‘the costs of
energy efficiency improvements are borne by landlords,
while the benefits (lower energy bills) accrue to current
or future tenants’ (DECC 2012, p. 18.) This disjuncture
between landlord and tenant is played out in MoPs in
extenuated form: in a rental situation the landlord can
hope to benefit from any gain in the capital value of the
improved building and may hope that over time rents
will rise to reflect the benefit of living in a more energy-
efficient home, but in a MoP with flats sold as lease-
holds, all the benefits are away from the freeholder.
Even if the freeholder (landlord) has the right to improve
common parts, it must generally bear the costs as the
service charge cannot usually be used to reclaim money
spent on improvement works, yet any increase in the
value of the building flows generally to the leaseholders
who ‘own’ the flats, and other benefits such as lower
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heating bills or warmer accommodation flow to the
current occupiers of the flats, who may be the lease-
holders or may be short term tenants renting from the
leaseholders. Rather than any incentives being split,
there is no incentive for the freeholder.
These issues could be resolved by the law ensuring
that the power to carry out work, the responsibility for
the cost of works and the benefit of completing the work
all falls within the same hands. This would echo the
default position in Scotland, in which flat owners have
free rein within their own units, and each flat owner has
a share of ownership in the common parts.
Routley et al. (2015) have made recommendations
for reform to the English system, which would provide
leaseholders with an independent right to make energy
efficiency improvements to the common parts, and en-
able leaseholders to make alterations in their own flat
provided that there is no harm to the building. If
adopted, these recommendations would resolve the split
incentives arising specifically from ownership law.
Regulation of management: no unitary body
Ownership law aligns the power to carry out upgrades to
common parts with receipt of the benefits in the Scottish
system, and in England in situations where the lease-
holders jointly own the freehold or have the ‘right to
manage’. Despite this alignment of power with incen-
tives, the law governing management of the decision-
making process can mean barriers remain nevertheless.
Under the Scottish system, apartment owners are not
required to organise themselves into a block manage-
ment company or co-operative (or join a pre-existing
one). The Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004, as a mini-
mum requirement, stipulates only that flat owners
should come together as and when needed to take action
on repairs and upkeep, agreeing on a case-by-case basis
who will undertake the management of the repair and
maintenance works. In England, there may be a compa-
ny structure if the leaseholders jointly own the freehold,
or have the RTM, but it is not unusual for there to be no
organised co-ownership decision-making body. The ab-
sence of any necessary, formalised corporate structure
prevents flat owners jointly accessing loans or grants to
pay for energy upgrades.
English and Scottish arrangements here contrast
sharply with arrangements in the other European coun-
tries. Lujanen (2010) suggests that most property law
systems require the formation of owners’ associations in
each apartment block. For example, in France, under the
copropriété ownership model, every apartment owner
becomes a member of the syndicat, a collectively
owned, private legal entity with the objectives of the
upkeep of the building and the management of the
common parts (Service-public.fr 2016).
The absence of a formalised association in England
and Scotland also profoundly limits the ability of gov-
ernment to regulate processes that would promote ener-
gy upgrades. For example, in Germany the owners’
association is required to maintain a renovation fund
of 1% of the value of the building, and in Finland the
association is obliged to develop a maintenance and
renovation plan.
Regulation of management: decision-making processes
Neither England nor Scotland has a necessary process to
bring co-owners together for decision making. In En-
gland, as mentioned earlier, even where leaseholders do
jointly own the freehold or have exercised the right to
manage, there may be no requirement to hold regular (or
any) co-owner meetings. In Scotland, general meetings
are not part of the tenement management scheme. In
other systems, where there are mandatory requirements
for owners’ associations, there are also mandatory ar-
rangements for decision-making processes. For exam-
ple, in Hungary, an annual meeting is required for apart-
ment owners, as is the appointment of an ‘audit com-
mittee’, usually of three apartment owners. Such insti-
tutional arrangements are not all that is required: in
France, there is a requirement for an annual residents’
association meeting (although LEAF (2016) highlights
that as it only has to meet once a year, it is not fully
effective as a forum to drive action on energy
efficiency).
Regulation of management: voting thresholds
for decision making
In the English system, the freeholder may be in a very
powerful position to undertake energy upgrades—
where leases allow it—without the specific agreement
of the apartment owners (though leaseholders must be
consulted for any significant expenditure). But, of
course, there is little or no incentive for it to do so.
In Scotland, as in other European jurisdictions for
which we have information, different majorities are
required for co-owners to take different upkeep and
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improvement decisions. Scotland effectively requires
unanimity for energy (and other) improvements, with
the exception of insulation upgrades which can be un-
dertaken on the same basis as repairs with a simple
majority of apartment owners. In France, the Loi de
transition énergétique of 2015 modified the rules to
allow decisions about energy efficiency upgrades to be
taken not by an absolute majority of flat owners’ shares
(as in the case of other improvements), but by a majority
decision amongst attendees at the general assembly (as
for other repair and maintenance). This tackles one of
the most profound barriers to energy efficiency decision
making in apartment blocks—the need to reach and
engage apartment owners who may have no interest or
who are difficult to contact.
Informational barriers arising from legal complexity
Apartment owners in England and Scotland face an
informational barrier in understanding the way their
property is owned and managed, and therefore the po-
tential for them to make energy upgrades. Leases (in
England) and title deeds (in Scotland) are complex
documents that are rarely read. The law itself is difficult
to follow. It is likely that the division of rights and
responsibilities are poorly understood, particularly for
owners of apartments who do not have easy access to
legal advice.
This barrier is compounded by the regulation of
energy performance certificates in the two countries.
Across Europe, the 2010 recast Energy Performance of
Buildings Directive requires that Energy Performance
Certificates (EPCs) have to be issued whenever a build-
ing or building unit is sold or rented out. There are
separate systems for the management and regulation of
EPCs in England and Wales, and in Scotland. Both
systems use the same methodology and, in both coun-
tries, EPC assessments in apartment blocks are carried
out on individual apartments, rather than on the whole
building. This is a minority approach within Europe:
74% of members states issue EPCs for apartments based
on an assessment of the whole apartment building (CA-
EED 2016). The merits of the two approaches, as they
have been seen by policymakers across Europe, have
been considered by the Concerted Action-EPBD:
The certification of an individual building unit
(i.e. apartment) could provide tailor-made mea-
surements for its refurbishment, especially when
there is an individual heating system and the cost
of the EPC is borne by the owner. However, it is
difficult to provide suggestions for measurements
concerning the whole building, e.g., roof insula-
tion or replacement of a common boiler. The
certification of the whole building, on the other
hand, provides recommendations for the building
envelope, and the heating system and its costs are
divided amongst the owners… It would be best to
have a certificate for both the building as well as
for the individual apartment, but this is considered
to be too expensive. (CA-EED 2016, p. 18).
This means that, in England, the freeholder (or
employed managing agent) has no information about
energy efficiency: the principal ‘owner’ of the building
is completely missed by this aspect of the Energy Per-
formance of Buildings regulations. In Scotland, individ-
ual flat owners will have their own EPC, but no infor-
mation on the whole building for which they are also
jointly responsible. In neither country is any information
provided about energy efficiency in common parts (e.g.
for communal lighting or lifts).
There is also a lack of specific information about the
potential for energy efficiency upgrades across apart-
ment blocks as EPCs only provide information on indi-
vidual apartments. An obvious policy development
would be to introduce a requirement for EPCs to be
issued on apartment blocks as whole buildings, as well
as on individual apartments. This would parallel the
situation in France where there is a mandatory energy
performance diagnosis and audit in co-ownership prop-
erties with a common heating system (LEAF 2016).
Reconceptualising property law in MoPS
to minimise governance barriers
The preceding section has enumerated specific instances
in which the current rules of property law in England or
Scotland (or both) act as a barrier to energy upgrades in
MoPs. Individual solutions can obviously be devised for
each of these problems. Our contention, however, is that
a piecemeal approach of this kind will be ineffective,
because the solutions proposed will fit poorly with the
understanding of property ownership which prevails in
European jurisdictions. Reform will be more effective if
it proceeds from a fundamental reconceptualisation of
ownership insofar as it relates to MoPs.
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Despite finding their roots in a variety of legal tradi-
tions, property law systems in Europe are largely united
in a basic understanding of ownership as providing ‘sole
and despotic dominion…over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individ-
ual in the universe.’ (Blackstone 1753, p. 1). Harris
(1996, pp. 29–32) describes the owner as ‘entirely free
to do what he will with his own, whether by way of use,
abuse or transfer’ and puts ‘self-seekingness’ at the cor-
nerstone of his notion of ownership. In reality, ownership
is never truly unqualified, as Harris recognises when he
acknowledges that ‘property limitation’ rules place limits
on the way in which assets are used through criminal law,
planning regulations, bankruptcy rules and so on. Never-
theless, the sense remains that ownership is a right in
relation to which any restrictions must be justified, and
the pivotal idea of ‘self-seekingness’ that Harris refers to
is inimical to any idea that owners must be ‘other-regard-
ing’. From that perspective, ownership has come to be
treated within the law as a sort of objective and neutral
truth, the validity of which is never questioned, and the
underlying values of which are rarely articulated,
let alone challenged (Cowan et al. 2016, pp. 227–228).
In so far as MoPs are concerned, this outlook on
ownership of parts of the building is reflected in the
cry: ‘My Apartment is my Castle: Leave me Alone!’ (a
chapter heading in van der Merwe 2015). In practice,
this conceptualisation of ownership as an absolute right
occasionally subject to restrictions is a poor fit for
ownership of part of a MoP. An owner of an apartment
is in a fundamentally interdependent relationship with
every other owner in the building: each relies on the
other to provide structural support and shelter, and each
must necessarily share certain parts of the building such
as the front door if any of them is to be able to exercise
their rights of ownership. The individualistic view of
ownership which has so much traction within the vari-
ous European legal traditions makes little sense here.
In addition, our contention is that this individualistic
approach to property ownership underlies most of the
governance barriers outlined in ‘How property law acts
as a barrier to energy upgrades in MoPS’ above. Calcu-
lating the outcome of a communal energy efficiency
measure as a series of individual profits and losses
results in the idea that benefits are misaligned, rather
than enjoyed by the broader MoP community as a
whole. The need for communal management fits poorly
within a system where each owner is viewed as an
individual. This notion is reflected within the study by
Matschoss et al. (2013, p. 1491), in which the country
report on Austria noted the comment of an expert that
the ‘owners do not really feel responsible for the con-
dominium and almost nobody is aware that the owner
association commonly owns the whole building togeth-
er. This makes it difficult to raise awareness for renova-
tion measures’. What is more, potential legal responses
addressing these barriers are hard to justify where this
paradigm prevails. Rules which tackle the misalignment
of benefits by obliging an owner to take an action which
may benefit her less than her neighbours, or may not
benefit her at all, appear illegitimate and illogical. Re-
quirements to participate in communal decision making,
or to accept the decisions of a majority, appear unfairly
burdensome. In general, the imposition of obligations
presents itself as a series of piecemeal limitations on the
default freedom of owners, which increases legal com-
plexity, reinforcing existing informational barriers.
Our proposal is to rethink the idea of ownership in
relation to MoPs to focus on its communal nature. We
draw here on the work of the progressive property group
of theorists (Alexander et al. 2009). Progressive proper-
ty scholars assert that property rights exist to serve a
number of underlying values, and argue that principal
amongst these values should be the promotion of ‘hu-
man flourishing’—simply put, the ability to live a good
life. To contribute to human flourishing, any system of
property law must certainly allow for secure rights to be
held in land and other assets, since a secure home, for
example, is necessary for a good life. However, to
meaningfully contribute to a good life, property law
must also recognise that owners of assets have obliga-
tions to others in society (Alexander 2009). The nature
of these obligations may incorporate environmental
concerns (Alexander 2009, pp. 796–801), the need to
‘acknowledg[e] and balanc[e] interests in the aggregate
welfare or wealth of society’, and the desirability of
protecting the poor and future generations (Peñalver
2009, pp. 868–869). Progressive property scholars also
emphasise that property law itself is not a set of un-
changing entitlements, but rather is a living institution
that can and should be drawn and redrawn in response to
the changing needs of society. In order to meet the
retrofit challenge, our contention is that models of prop-
erty ownership employed in relation to MoPs should be
redrawn in precisely this way in order to move away
from individualism, and encompass instead collective-
focused ideas about governance of the commons and the
welfare of society.
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If we view the law of property in relation to MoPs
through this lens, an argument can be made for an under-
standing of ownership that incorporates the interdepen-
dence inherent in the structure of the apartment building.
At a basic level, owners of any part of the building should
be under an obligation to take into account the needs of
other owners, and to make decisions about their
occupation and use of the property in a way that is
reasonable bearing that obligation in mind. Blandy and
Robinson (2001, pp. 408) acknowledge ‘the inevitable
difficulties and co-dependency which arise from sharing
the same building’ and suggest, citing the work of Bailey
and Robertson, that the ‘idea that residents have to give up
‘some of their individual rights ... but gain collective rights
... of control over the immediate environment surrounding
their home’ requires embedding in our conception of
multi-occupancy’. This co-dependency and co-operation
can be most easily accommodated within progressive
understandings of property. Within this conceptualisation,
the responsibility to (for example) attend meetings with
other owners to decide on works that would benefit the
MoP as a whole follows logically from the choice to
acquire the ownership interest in the first place. A collec-
tivist understanding of ownership would be a sound basis
on which to resolve the issues around misalignment of
incentives and regulation of management outlined above.
It may also create scope for imposing penalties on owners
who do not fulfil the responsibilities attaching to their
ownership or justify incentives for groups of owners to
embrace collectivism in order to achieve retrofit goals. In
addition, a reconceptualisation of this kind would go a
long way towards making the law more coherent, thereby
reducing the informational barriers.
In arguing for a reconceptualisation of ownership in
relation toMoPs, we do not mean to suggest that current
property law rules within European systems uniformly
fail to recognise obligations on apartment owners. As
we have indicated above, such obligations can and do
exist. However, our contention is that a more fundamen-
tal shift in the predominant paradigm of ownership will
be needed to effect the systematic changes in MoP
governance regimes which are likely to be necessary
to meet European energy efficiency targets.
Conclusions and further research
Article 19 of the EED requires member states to ‘eval-
uate and if necessary take appropriate measures to
remove regulatory and non-regulatory barriers to energy
efficiency’, including as regards ‘the split of incen-
tives……among owners [of a building].’ The doctrinal
analysis above demonstrates that property law rules
create a particular set of governance barriers situated
within the broader model identified in the energy effi-
ciency literature to date. The law regulating ownership
of different parts of a MoP creates a misalignment of
incentives for retrofit works, where the power to carry
out the works, the responsibility to bear the costs and the
benefits received as a result are not all held in the same
hands. The legal rules (or absence of rules) around
decision-making processes create organisational barriers
and impinge on the capacity of MoP owners to obtain
funding for works or benefit from cost-sharing arrange-
ments. The complexity of the law generates informa-
tional barriers, particularly for MoP owners without
easy access to legal advice. Underpinning these specific
issues, as explored in our theoretical inquiry above, is an
embedded sense of ownership as an individual right.
MoP owners are fundamentally interdependent.
Reconceptualising the law of MoP ownership within
the collectivist understanding set out by progressive
property scholarship could provide a solid theoretical
base for tackling the governance barriers created by
property law in a holistic fashion, rather than through
piecemeal legal reform.
The analysis presented above makes clear that it will
be important for Europe, collectively and as individual
states, to obtain a comprehensive documentation of the
law around ownership and management arrangements
in MoPs. Property law rules are as important as the
physical features of buildings in determining the energy
efficiency retrofit opportunities. To some extent, the
gathering of cross-European insight in this area may
have been neglected due to the specialist nature of the
legal issues and the huge variation in property law
between and even within member states, as shown by
England and Scotland. However, the significance of the
property law barrier to energy efficiency suggests that
these challenges must now be faced.
Empirical work will also be essential in understand-
ing the extent of the barriers here. Ownership and man-
agement of individual buildings will, in many EU coun-
tries, be determined to some extent by the specific
agreements between owners. Research is needed into
those agreements—title deeds, leases, contracts with
building managers etc.—and how management is deliv-
ered in practice. More also needs to be understood about
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decision-making behaviours for energy efficiency with-
in prevailing governance arrangements. How are discus-
sions about energy efficiency conducted within resi-
dents’ groups or meetings? How do professional build-
ing managers interact with non-professional home
owners? Qualitative and quantitative research focused
on group decisions in apartment blocks to date seems
absent.
The data provided by further research will allow for
the reconceptualisation hypothesis outlined above to be
fully tested. Ultimately, this may form the basis of
proposals for law reform designed to tackle the barriers
to retrofit created by property law throughout Europe.
The law is complex, and making the changes neces-
sary to address the decision-making barriers to energy
efficiency is challenging, but reform is possible and can
be achieved without—as Article 19 says—‘prejudice to
the basic principles of the property and tenancy law of
the Member State.’ Regulation of Europe’s apartment
blocks will reflect the strength of society’s view that
there is a real need to tackle the causes and effects of
climate change.
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